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Harvard Business Law Review (HBLR)

Harvard Business Law Review (HBLR)

The Harvard Business Law Review (HBLR) aims to be the premier journal covering the laws of business organization and capital markets. HBLR will publish articles from professors, practitioners, and policymakers on corporate law and governance, securities and capital markets law, financial regulation and financial institutions, law and finance, financial distress and bankruptcy, and related subjects.

  • About
    • About HBLR
    • Masthead
      • Volume 12 Masthead (2022)
      • Volume 11 Masthead (2021)
      • Volume 10 Masthead (2020)
      • Volume 9 Masthead (2019)
      • Volume 8 Masthead (2018)
      • Volume 7 Masthead (2017)
      • Volume 6 Masthead (2016)
      • Volume 5 Masthead (2015)
      • Volume 4 Masthead (2014)
      • Volume 3 Masthead (2013)
      • Volume 2 Masthead (2012)
      • Volume 1 Masthead (2011)
  • HLS Students
    • 1L Students
    • 2L Transfers and LLM Students
    • Student Writing
  • HBLR Print
    • Order Issues
    • Volume 12 (2022)
      • Volume 12, Issue 2
      • Volume 12, Issue 1
    • Volume 11 (2021)
      • Volume 11, Issue 2
      • Volume 11, Issue 1
    • Volume 10 (2020)
      • Volume 10, Issue 2
      • Volume 10, Issue 1
    • Volume 9 (2019)
      • Volume 9, Issue 2
      • Volume 9, Issue 1
    • Volume 8 (2018)
      • Volume 8, Issue 2 (2018)
      • Volume 8, Issue 1 (2018)
    • Volume 7 (2017)
      • Volume 7, Issue 2 (2017)
      • Volume 7, Issue 1 (2017)
    • Volume 6 (2016)
      • Volume 6, Issue 2 (2017)
      • Volume 6, Issue 1 (2016)
    • Volume 5 (2015)
      • Volume 5, Issue 2 (2015)
      • Volume 5, Issue 1 (2015)
    • Volume 4 (2014)
      • Volume 4, Issue 2 (2014) – Benefit Corporations
      • Volume 4, Issue 1 (2014)
    • Volume 3 (2013)
      • Volume 3, Issue 2 (2013) – Corporate Political Spending
      • Volume 3, Issue 1 (2013) – Shareholder Activism
    • Volume 2 (2012)
      • Volume 2, Issue 2 (2012) – Complexity of Financial Regulation
      • Volume 2, Issue 1 (2012) – Sovereign Debt Crisis
  • HBLR Online
    • Current Accounts
      • Current Accounts (2018–2023)
    • Volume 12 (2021-2022)
    • Volume 11 (2020-2021)
    • Volume 10 (2019-2020)
    • Volume 9 (2018-2019)
    • Volume 8 (2017-2018)
    • Volume 7 (2016-2017)
    • Volume 6 (2015-2016)
    • Volume 5 (2014-2015)
    • Volume 4 (2013-2014)
    • Volume 3 (2012-2013)
    • Volume 2 (2011-2012)
    • Volume 1 (2010-2011)
  • Submissions
    • Online Edition
    • Print Edition

Welcome to the Harvard Business Law Review

HBLR is hiring!

Incoming and current HLS students: we’re very excited to announce that we are opening Upper Masthead and Board applications for the upcoming year’s Volume XIV (2023–2024).

The Harvard Business Law Review (HBLR) is a student organization aiming to be the premier source of articles concerning laws governing business organization and capital markets. We publish articles by scholars, practitioners, and policymakers on corporate law and governance, securities and capital markets law, financial regulation and financial institutions, law and finance, financial distress and bankruptcy, and related subjects.

  • Latest Volume
  • Submit
  • Join Us

Latest Volume

On Volume 12, you will find articles about board diversity and corporate purpose, labor capital, litigation risks, Facebook, human capital accounting, mandatory board gender-balancing, and ESG accountability.

Volume 12

Submit

HBLR stands at the intersection of law and business and is committed to publishing research and commentary on a wide range of developments in business and commercial law. We welcome you to learn more about our print submissions process.

Print Submissions

Join Us

If you want to get involved in HBLR, please find our resources for each class and program below.

1L Students
2L Transfer, LLM, and Exchange Students
Student Writing

Featured Article

Shifting Influences on Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness and Policy Channeling

Ronald J. Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt

Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is or should be the center of the corporate governance solar system. In this essay, we argue that, as with binary stars, the shape of the governance system is at any time the result of the interaction of two central influences, which we refer to as capital market completeness and policy channeling. In contrast to single factor models, which reflect a stable normative statement of what should drive corporate governance, in our account the relation between these two governance influences is dynamic.

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Contact Information

hblr@mail.law.harvard.edu
1585 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Sponsors

  • Kirkland & Ellis
  • Sullivan & Cromwell
  • Davis Polk
  • Cleary Gottlieb
  • Debevoise & Plimpton
  • Paul Weiss
  • Ropes & Gray
  • Simpson Thacher
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Schulte Roth & Zabel

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